dc.contributor.author | Lopez-de-Salanes, Florencio | |
dc.contributor.author | Shleifer, Andrei | |
dc.contributor.author | Vishny, Robert | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-03-08T20:59:15Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1997 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W Vishny. 1997. Privatization in the United States. Rand Journal of Economics 28, no. 3: 447-471 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 0741-6261 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:30727606 | |
dc.description.abstract | In the United States, the two principal modes of producing local government services are inhouse provision by government employees and contracting out to private suppliers, also known as privatization. We examine empirically how United States counties choose their mode of providing services. The evidence indicates that state clean-governance laws and state restricting county spending encourage privatization, whereas strong public unions discourage it. The evidence is inconsistent with the view that efficiency considerations along govern the provision mode, and points to the important roles played by political patronage and taxpayer resistance to government spending in the privatization decision. | en_US |
dc.description.sponsorship | Economics | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
dc.publisher | RAND | en_US |
dc.relation.isversionof | https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi?action=view&year=1997&issue=aut&page=447&&tid=152740&sc=1UVkp6pt | en_US |
dash.license | LAA | |
dc.title | Privatization in the United States | en_US |
dc.type | Journal Article | en_US |
dc.description.version | Accepted Manuscript | en_US |
dc.relation.journal | RAND Journal of Economics | en_US |
dash.depositing.author | Shleifer, Andrei | |
dc.date.available | 2017-03-08T20:59:15Z | |
dash.authorsordered | false | |
dash.contributor.affiliated | Shleifer, Andrei | |