The Regulation of Entry

DSpace/Manakin Repository

The Regulation of Entry

Citable link to this page

 

 
Title: The Regulation of Entry
Author: Djankov, S.; La Porta, R.; Lopez-de-Silanes, F.; Shleifer, Andrei

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: Djankov, S., R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer. 2002. The Regulation of Entry. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, no. 1: 1–37. doi:10.1162/003355302753399436.
Full Text & Related Files:
Abstract: We present new data on the regulation of entry of start-up firms in 75 countries. The data set contains information on the number of procedures, official time, and official cost that a start-up must bear before it can operate legally. The official costs of entry are extremely high in most countries. Countries with heavier regulation of entry have higher corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality of public or private goods. Countries with more democratic and limited governments have fewer entry regulations. The evidence is inconsistent with Pigouvian (helping hand) theories of benevolent regulation, but support the (grabbing hand) view that entry regulation benefits politicians and bureaucrats.
Published Version: doi:10.1162/003355302753399436
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:30747190
Downloads of this work:

Show full Dublin Core record

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

 
 

Search DASH


Advanced Search
 
 

Submitters