The Regulation of Entry
La Porta, R.
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CitationDjankov, S., R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer. 2002. The Regulation of Entry. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, no. 1: 1–37. doi:10.1162/003355302753399436.
AbstractWe present new data on the regulation of entry of start-up firms in 75 countries. The data set contains information on the number of procedures, official time, and official cost that a start-up must bear before it can operate legally. The official costs of entry are extremely high in most countries. Countries with heavier regulation of entry have higher corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality of public or private goods. Countries with more democratic and limited governments have fewer entry regulations. The evidence is inconsistent with Pigouvian (helping hand) theories of benevolent regulation, but support the (grabbing hand) view that entry regulation benefits politicians and bureaucrats.
Citable link to this pagehttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:30747190
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