Incomplete Contracts and the Internal Organization of Firms

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Incomplete Contracts and the Internal Organization of Firms

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Title: Incomplete Contracts and the Internal Organization of Firms
Author: Aghion, P; Bloom, N.; Van Reenen, J.

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Citation: Aghion, P., N. Bloom, and J. Van Reenen. 2013. “Incomplete Contracts and the Internal Organization of Firms.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 30 (suppl 1) (July 19): i37–i63. doi:10.1093/jleo/ewt003.
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Abstract: We survey the theoretical and empirical literature on decentralization within firms. We first discuss how the concept of incomplete contracts shapes our views about the organization of decision-making. We then overview the empirical evidence on the determinants of decentralization and on the effects of decentralization on firm performance. A number of factors highlighted in the theory are shown to be important in accounting for delegation, such as heterogeneity and congruence of preferences as proxied by trust. Empirically, competition, human capital, and IT also appear to foster decentralization. There are substantial gaps between theoretical and empirical work and we suggest avenues for future research in bridging this gap
Published Version: 10.1093/jleo/ewt003
Other Sources: http://www.nber.org/papers/w18842
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#OAP
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:30752801
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