Interpretation Theory and the First Person

 
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https://doi.org/10.2307/2219738
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Moran, Richard. 1994. Interpretation theory and the first person. Philosophical Quarterly 44, no. 175: 154-173.
Abstract
Discusses the rationalizing view of psychological discourse and the requirements of common sense psychology, specifically that of accommodating both first- and third-person ascriptions of mental states. Intentional psychology as a theory; Self-ascription and univocality; Interpretation theory and the first person; Saving the asymmetries; Rationality and the two perspectives of intentional psychology.
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http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~moran/writings.html
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http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3157885

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