Interpretation Theory and the First Person
Citation
Moran, Richard. 1994. Interpretation theory and the first person. Philosophical Quarterly 44, no. 175: 154-173.Abstract
Discusses the rationalizing view of psychological discourse and the requirements of common sense psychology, specifically that of accommodating both first- and third-person ascriptions of mental states. Intentional psychology as a theory; Self-ascription and univocality; Interpretation theory and the first person; Saving the asymmetries; Rationality and the two perspectives of intentional psychology.Other Sources
http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~moran/writings.htmlTerms of Use
This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAACitable link to this page
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3157885
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