Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games
| Title: | Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games |
| Author: |
Levine, David; Fudenberg, Drew
Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors. |
| Citation: | Fudenberg, Drew, and David K. Levine. 1997. Measuring players' losses in experimental games. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, no. 2: 507-536. |
| Full Text & Related Files: |
fudenberg_measuring.pdf (197.3Kb; PDF) 
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| Abstract: | In some experiments rational players who understand the structure of the game could improve their payoff. We bound the size of the observed losses in several such experiments. To do this, we suppose that observed play resembles an equilibrium because players learn about their opponents' play. Consequently, in an extensive-form game, some actions that are not optimal given the true distribution of opponents' play could be optimal given available information. We find that average losses are small: $0.03 to $0.64 per player with stakes between $2 and $30. In one of the three experiments we examine, this also implies a narrow range of outcome. |
| Published Version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/003355397555271 |
| Terms of Use: | This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA |
| Citable link to this page: | http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3160492 |
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