Emergence of Cooperation and Evolutionary Stability in Finite Populations

DSpace/Manakin Repository

Emergence of Cooperation and Evolutionary Stability in Finite Populations

Citable link to this page


Title: Emergence of Cooperation and Evolutionary Stability in Finite Populations
Author: Fudenberg, Drew; Nowak, Martin; Sasaki, Akira; Taylor, Christine

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: Nowak, Martin A., Akira Sasaki, Christine Taylor, and Drew Fudenberg. 2004. Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations. Nature 428(6983): 646-650.
Full Text & Related Files:
Abstract: To explain the evolution of cooperation by natural selection has been a major goal of biologists since Darwin. Cooperators help others at a cost to themselves, while defectors receive the benefits of altruism without providing any help in return. The standard game dynamical formulation is the 'Prisoner's Dilemma', in which two players have a choice between cooperation and defection. In the repeated game, cooperators using direct reciprocity cannot be exploited by defectors, but it is unclear how such cooperators can arise in the first place. In general, defectors are stable against invasion by cooperators. This understanding is based on traditional concepts of evolutionary stability and dynamics in infinite populations. Here we study evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations. We show that a single cooperator using a strategy like 'tit-for-tat' can invade a population of defectors with a probability that corresponds to a net selective advantage. We specify the conditions required for natural selection to favour the emergence of cooperation and define evolutionary stability in finite populations.
Published Version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nature02414
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3196331
Downloads of this work:

Show full Dublin Core record

This item appears in the following Collection(s)


Search DASH

Advanced Search