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dc.contributor.authorFudenberg, Drew
dc.contributor.authorLevine, David
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-22T13:57:14Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.identifier.citationFudenberg, Drew, and David K. Levine. 2007. Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring. Review of Economic Dynamics 10(2): 173-192.en
dc.identifier.issn1094-2025en
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3196334
dc.description.abstractIn a repeated game with imperfect public information, the set of equilibria depends on the way that the distribution of public signals varies with the players' actions. Recent research has focused on the case of “frequent monitoring,” where the time interval between periods becomes small. Here we study a simple example of a commitment game with a long-run and short-run player in order to examine different specifications of how the signal distribution depends upon period length. We give a simple criterion for the existence of efficient equilibrium, and show that the efficiency of the equilibria that can be supported depends in an important way on the effect of the player's actions on the variance of the signals, and whether extreme values of the signals are “bad news” of “cheating” behavior, or “good news” of “cooperative” behavior.en
dc.description.sponsorshipEconomicsen
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.publisherElsevieren
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2007.02.002en
dash.licenseLAA
dc.subjectrepeated moral hazarden
dc.subjectrepeated gamesen
dc.subjectimperfect monitoringen
dc.subjectcontinuous-time limiten
dc.subjectdiffusion processen
dc.subjectfolk theoremen
dc.titleContinuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoringen
dc.relation.journalReview of Economic Dynamicsen
dash.depositing.authorFudenberg, Drew
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.red.2007.02.002*
dash.contributor.affiliatedFudenberg, Drew


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