Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium
| Title: | Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium |
| Author: |
Levine, David; Dekel, Eddie; Fudenberg, Drew
Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors. |
| Citation: | Dekel, Eddie, Drew Fudenberg, and David K. Levine. 1999. Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium. Journal of Economic Theory 89, no. 2: 165-185. |
| Full Text & Related Files: |
fudenberg_payoff.pdf (378.8Kb; PDF) 
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| Abstract: | In a self-confirming equilibrium, each player correctly forecasts the actions that opponents will take along the equilibrium path, but may be mistaken about the way that opponents would respond to deviations. This paper develops a refinement of self-confirming equilibrium in which players use information about opponents' payoffs in forming beliefs about the way that opponents play off of the equilibrium path. We show that this concept is robust to payoff uncertainty. We also discuss its relationship to other concepts and show that it is closely related to assuming almost common certainty of payoffs in an epistemic model with independent beliefs. |
| Published Version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2576 |
| Terms of Use: | This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA |
| Citable link to this page: | http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3200614 |
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