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dc.contributor.authorDekel, Eddie
dc.contributor.authorFudenberg, Drew
dc.contributor.authorLevine, David
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T20:54:22Z
dc.date.issued1999
dc.identifier.citationDekel, Eddie, Drew Fudenberg, and David K. Levine. 1999. Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium. Journal of Economic Theory 89, no. 2: 165-185.en
dc.identifier.issn0022-0531en
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3200614
dc.description.abstractIn a self-confirming equilibrium, each player correctly forecasts the actions that opponents will take along the equilibrium path, but may be mistaken about the way that opponents would respond to deviations. This paper develops a refinement of self-confirming equilibrium in which players use information about opponents' payoffs in forming beliefs about the way that opponents play off of the equilibrium path. We show that this concept is robust to payoff uncertainty. We also discuss its relationship to other concepts and show that it is closely related to assuming almost common certainty of payoffs in an epistemic model with independent beliefs.en
dc.description.sponsorshipEconomicsen
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.publisherElsevieren
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2576en
dash.licenseLAA
dc.titlePayoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibriumen
dc.relation.journalJournal of Economic Theoryen
dash.depositing.authorFudenberg, Drew
dc.identifier.doi10.1006/jeth.1999.2576*
dash.contributor.affiliatedFudenberg, Drew


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