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dc.contributor.authorImhof, Lorens
dc.contributor.authorFudenberg, Drew
dc.contributor.authorNowak, Martin
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-29T13:27:36Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.identifier.citationImhof, Lorens A., Drew Fudenberg, and Martin A. Nowak. 2007. Tit-for-tat or win-stay, lose-shift? Journal of Theoretical Biology 247, no. 3: 574-580.en
dc.identifier.issn0022-5193en
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3200671
dc.description.abstractThe repeated Prisoner's Dilemma is usually known as a story of tit-for-tat (TFT). This remarkable strategy has won both of Robert Axelrod's tournaments. TFT does whatever the opponent has done in the previous round. It will cooperate if the opponent has cooperated, and it will defect if the opponent has defected. But TFT has two weaknesses: (i) it cannot correct mistakes (erroneous moves) and (ii) a population of TFT players is undermined by random drift when mutant strategies appear which play always-cooperate (ALLC). Another equally simple strategy called ‘win-stay, lose-shift’ (WSLS) has neither of these two disadvantages. WSLS repeats the previous move if the resulting payoff has met its aspiration level and changes otherwise. Here, we use a novel approach of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations to study mutation–selection dynamics in the presence of erroneous moves. We compare four strategies: always-defect (ALLD), ALLC, TFT and WSLS. There are two possible outcomes: if the benefit of cooperation is below a critical value then ALLD is selected; if the benefit of cooperation is above this critical value then WSLS is selected. TFT is never selected in this evolutionary process, but lowers the selection threshold for WSLS.en
dc.description.sponsorshipEconomicsen
dc.description.sponsorshipMathematicsen
dc.description.sponsorshipOrganismic and Evolutionary Biologyen
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.publisherElsevieren
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.03.027en
dash.licenseLAA
dc.subjectevolutionary game dynamicsen
dc.subjectfinite populationen
dc.subjectmutation-selection processen
dc.subjectprisoner's dilemmaen
dc.titleTit-for-Tat or Win-Stay, Lose-Shift?en
dc.relation.journalJournal of Theoretical Biologyen
dash.depositing.authorFudenberg, Drew
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.03.027*
dash.contributor.affiliatedFudenberg, Drew
dash.contributor.affiliatedNowak, Martin


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