Conditional Universal Consistency
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CitationFudenberg, Drew, and David K. Levine. 1999. Conditional universal consistency. Games and Economic Behavior 29(1-2): 104-130.
AbstractPlayers choose an action before learning an outcome chosen according to an unknown and history-dependent stochastic rule. Procedures that categorize outcomes, and use a randomized variation on fictitious play within each category are studied. These procedures are “conditionally consistent:” they yield almost as high a time-average payoff as if the player knew the conditional distributions of actions given categories. Moreover, given any alternative procedure, there is a conditionally consistent procedure whose performance is no more than epsilon worse regardless of the discount factor. We also discuss cycles, and argue that the time-average of play should resemble a correlated equilibrium.
Citable link to this pagehttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3204826
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