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dc.contributor.authorAmbrus, Attila
dc.contributor.authorArgenziano, Rossella
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-07T14:39:13Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.identifier.citationAmbrus, Attila, and Rossella Argenziano. 2009. Asymmetric networks in two-sided markets. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 1(1): 17-52.en
dc.identifier.issn1945-7669en
dc.identifier.issn1945-7685en
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3204916
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates pricing decisions and network choices in two-sided markets with network externalities. Consumers are heterogeneous in how much they value the externality. Imposing restrictions on the extent of coordination failure among consumers generates clear qualitative conclusions about equilibrium market configurations. Multiple asymmetric networks can coexist in equilibrium, both in the case of a monopolist network provider and in the case of competing providers. These equilibria have the property that one network is cheaper and larger on one side, while the other network is cheaper and larger on the other side. Product differentiation is endogenized by consumers' network choices.en
dc.description.sponsorshipEconomicsen
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.publisherAmerican Economic Associationen
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.1.1.17en
dash.licenseLAA
dc.titleAsymmetric Networks in Two-Sided Marketsen
dc.typeJournal Article
dc.description.versionAccepted Manuscript
dc.relation.journalAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomicsen
dash.depositing.authorAmbrus, Attila
dc.identifier.doi10.1257/mic.1.1.17*
dash.contributor.affiliatedAmbrus, Attila


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