Evolution, Cooperation, and Repeated Games
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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85436-4_4Metadata
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Maskin, E. 2009. “Evolution, Cooperation, and Repeated Games.” Games, Groups, and the Global Good: Springer Series in Game Theory: 79–84. doi:10.1007/978-3-540-85436-4_4.Abstract
I discuss recent work that characterizes what outcomes correspond to evolutionarily stable strategies in two-player symmetric repeated games when players have a positive probability of making a mistake.Terms of Use
This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#OAPCitable link to this page
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:32071232
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