On The Robustness of Majority Rule
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https://doi.org/10.1162/JEEA.2008.6.5.949Metadata
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Dasgupta, Partha, and Eric Maskin. 2008. “On The Robustness of Majority Rule.” Journal of the European Economic Association 6 (5) (September): 949–973. doi:10.1162/jeea.2008.6.5.949.Abstract
We show that simple majority rule satisfies the Pareto property, anonymity, neutrality, and (generic) transitivity on a bigger class of preference domains than any other voting rule. If we replace neutrality in the above list of properties with independence of irrelevant alternatives, then the correspondingconclusion holds for unanimity rule (rule by consensus).
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