Types of deception revealed by individual differences in cognitive abilities
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https://doi.org/10.1080/17470910802299987Metadata
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Morgan, Charity J., Julia B. LeSage, and Stephen M. Kosslyn. 2009. “Types of Deception Revealed by Individual Differences in Cognitive Abilities.” Social Neuroscience 4 (6) (December): 554–569. doi:10.1080/17470910802299987.Abstract
The two studies reported in this article are an extension of the neuroimaging study by Ganis et al. (2003), which provided evidence that different types of lies arise from different cognitive processes. We examined the initial response times (IRTs) to questions answered both deceptively and truthfully. We considered four types of deceptive responses: a coherent set of rehearsed, memorized lies about a life experience; a coherent set of lies spontaneously created about a life experience; a set of isolated lies involving self-knowledge; and a set of isolated lies involving knowledge of another person. We assessed the difference between truthful and deceptive IRTs. Scores from cognitive tasks included in the MiniCog Rapid Assessment Battery (MRAB) were significant predictors of IRT differences. Each type of lie was predicted by a distinct set of MRAB scores. These results provide further evidence that deception is a multifaceted process and that different kinds of lies arise from the operation of different cognitive processes.Citable link to this page
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:32095400
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