Finance and Institutional Investors

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Finance and Institutional Investors

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Title: Finance and Institutional Investors
Author: Jung, Jiwook; Dobbin, Frank

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: Jung, Jiwook, and Frank Dobbin. 2012. Finance and institutional investors. In The Oxford handbook of the sociology of finance, ed. Karin Knorr Cetina and Alex Preda, 52-74. New York: Oxford University Press.
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Abstract: Institutional investors have come to play a central role in financial markets since the early 1970s. They controlled about three out of ten shares of Fortune 500 companies in 1970. Today they control seven out of ten. The aging of the baby boom generation, coupled with new fiduciary requirements for defined benefit pension plans, contributed to this change. Agency theory offered a litany of innovations designed to ensure that executives pursued the interests of shareholders, rather than feathering their own nests. Institutional investors promoted the theory with a vengeance, encouraging firms through shareholder proposals and private bidding to put its prescriptions into place. This article examines the role of institutional investors in promoting changes in corporate management under the banner of shareholder value. It reviews evidence that these changes did little to promote share value and that they resulted in several disadvantages for the American worker-owner.
Published Version: doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199590162.013.0004
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:32116902
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