Cooperation by Design: Leadership, Structure, and Collective Dilemmas

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Cooperation by Design: Leadership, Structure, and Collective Dilemmas

Show simple item record Bianco, William Bates, Robert 2009-08-25T17:46:34Z 1990
dc.identifier.citation Bianco, William T., and Robert H. Bates. 1990. Cooperation by design: leadership, structure, and collective dilemmas. American Political Science Review 84(1): 133-147. en
dc.identifier.issn 1537-5943 en
dc.identifier.issn 0003-0554 en
dc.description.abstract We return to the analysis of cooperation among interdependent rational individuals. We emphasize the limited impact of iteration (or repeated play) and explore the possibility of an alternative: intervention by rational agents, whom we call leaders. We show that leadership is more significant for initiating cooperation than for sustaining it. In addition, we identify two features of organizations that are critical in determining a leader's ability to initiate and sustain cooperation by structuring the incentives of his followers: the leader's capabilities (information and strategy sets) and reward structure (payoff function). en
dc.description.sponsorship African and African American Studies en
dc.description.sponsorship Government en
dc.language.iso en_US en
dc.publisher Cambridge University Press en
dc.relation.isversionof en
dash.license LAA
dc.title Cooperation by Design: Leadership, Structure, and Collective Dilemmas en
dc.relation.journal American Political Science Review en Bates, Robert

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