Critical Normativity

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Critical Normativity

Show simple item record Singer, Joseph William 2009-09-11T17:59:40Z 2009
dc.identifier.citation Joseph W. Singer, Critical Normativity, 20 Law and Critique 27 (2009). en_US
dc.identifier.issn 0957-8536 en_US
dc.description.abstract Skeptics argue that statements about right and wrong are merely expressions of preferences. They are mistaken; values are not the same as mere preferences. When we assert preferences that affect others, we justify our actions by giving reasons that we believe others should accept. When we evaluate those reasons, we typically reject certain preferences as illegitimate. Values are different from preferences because they entail demands we feel entitled to make of each other, after critical reflection. But this does not require us to become moral realists who base value judgments on the existence of moral facts. Critical normativity adopts the paradoxical stance that value judgments are based on human will but that they can be right or wrong. Human beings cannot live without strong normative claims but we are obligated to be careful about them. This article illustrates this stance by telling three parables of justice. en_US
dc.language.iso en_US en_US
dc.publisher Springer en_US
dc.relation.isversionof doi:10.1007/s10978-008-9038-6 en_US
dash.license LAA
dc.subject legal theory en_US
dc.subject critical theory en_US
dc.subject postmodernism en_US
dc.subject fairness en_US
dc.title Critical Normativity en_US
dc.type Journal Article en_US
dc.description.version Accepted Manuscript en_US
dc.relation.journal Law and Critique en_US Singer, Joseph William 2009-09-11T17:59:40Z

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