Impersonation Strategies in Auctions

DSpace/Manakin Repository

Impersonation Strategies in Auctions

Citable link to this page

 

 
Title: Impersonation Strategies in Auctions
Author: Kash, Ian; Parkes, David C.

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: Kash, Ian A., and David C. Parkes. 2010. “Impersonation Strategies in Auctions.” In Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop, WINE 2010, Stanford, CA, USA, December 13-17, 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science: 492–495. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-17572-5_42.
Access Status: Full text of the requested work is not available in DASH at this time (“dark deposit”). For more information on dark deposits, see our FAQ.
Full Text & Related Files:
Abstract: A common approach to analyzing repeated auctions, such as sponsored search auctions, is to treat them as complete information games, because it is assumed that, over time, players learn each other’s types. This overlooks the possibility that players may impersonate another type. Many standard auctions (including generalized second price auctions and core-selecting auctions), as well as the Kelly mechanism, have profitable impersonations. We define a notion of impersonationproofness for the auction mechanism coupled with a process by which players learn about each other’s type, and show an equivalence to a problem of dominant-strategy mechanism design.
Published Version: doi:10.1007/978-3-642-17572-5_42
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:33009324
Downloads of this work:

Show full Dublin Core record

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

 
 

Search DASH


Advanced Search
 
 

Submitters