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dc.contributor.authorHeese, Jonas
dc.contributor.authorKhan, Mozaffar
dc.contributor.authorRamanna, Karthik
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-28T16:27:07Z
dc.date.issued2017-06-28
dc.identifier.citationHeese, Jonas, Mozaffar Khan, and Karthik Ramanna. "Is the SEC Captured? Evidence from Comment-Letter Reviews." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 17-087, April 2017. (Revised June 2017; forthcoming at the Journal of Accounting & Economics.)en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:33111777
dc.description.abstractSEC oversight of publicly listed firms ranges from comment letter (CL) reviews of firms’ reporting compliance to pursuing enforcement actions against violators. Prior literature finds that firm political connections (PC) negatively predict enforcement actions, inferring SEC capture. We present new evidence that firm PC positively predict CL reviews and substantive characteristics of such reviews, including the number of issues evaluated and the seniority of SEC staff involved. These results, robust to identification concerns, are inconsistent with SEC capture and indicate a more nuanced relation between firm PC and SEC oversight than previously suggested.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dash.licenseOAP
dc.titleIs the SEC captured? Evidence from comment-letter reviewsen_US
dc.typeResearch Paper or Reporten_US
dc.description.versionAuthor's Originalen_US
dc.relation.journalHarvard Business School working paper series # 17-087en_US
dash.depositing.authorHeese, Jonas
dc.date.available2017-06-28T16:27:07Z
dash.contributor.affiliatedKhan, Mozaffar
dash.contributor.affiliatedRamanna, Karthik
dash.contributor.affiliatedHeese, Jonas


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