Now showing items 1-7 of 7

    • Asset Price Dynamics in Partially Segmented Markets 

      Greenwood, Robin; Hanson, Samuel; Liao, Gordon Y (Oxford University Press (OUP), 2018-09)
      We develop a model in which capital moves quickly within an asset class but slowly between asset classes. While most investors specialize in a single asset class, a handful of generalists can gradually reallocate capital ...
    • Corporate Debt, Firm Size and Financial Fragility in Emerging Markets 

      Alfaro, Laura; Asis, Gonzalo; Chari, Anusha; Panizza, Ugo (Elsevier BV, 2019-05)
      The post-Global Financial Crisis period shows a surge in corporate leverage in emerging markets and a number of countries with deteriorated corporate financial fragility indicators (Altman’s Z-score). Firm size plays a ...
    • Extrapolation and bubbles 

      Barberis, Nicholas; Greenwood, Robin; Jin, Lawrence; Shleifer, Andrei (Elsevier BV, 2018-08)
      We present an extrapolative model of bubbles. In the model, many investors form their demand for a risky asset by weighing two signals: an average of the asset’s past price changes and the asset’s degree of overvaluation. ...
    • Games of Threats 

      Kohlberg, Elon; Neyman, Abraham (Elsevier BV, 2018-03)
      A game of threats on a finite set of players, N, is a function d that assigns a real number to any coalition, S ⊆ N, such that d(S) = -d(N\S). A game of threats is not necessarily a coalitional game as it may fail to satisfy ...
    • Managing the Family Firm: Evidence from CEOs at Work 

      Bandiera, Oriana; Lemos, Renata; Prat, Andrea; Sadun, Raffaella (Oxford University Press (OUP), 2017-12-07)
      We present evidence on the labor supply of CEOs and on whether family and professional CEOs differ on this dimension. We do so through a new survey instrument that allows us to codify CEOs’ diaries in a detailed and ...
    • The Political Influence of Voters’ Interests on SEC Enforcement 

      Heese, Jonas (Wiley, 2019-07)
      I examine whether political influence as a response to voters’ interest in employment levels is reflected in the enforcement actions of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). I find that large employers are less ...
    • Social Risk, Fiscal Risk, and the Portfolio of Government Programs 

      Hanson, Samuel; Scharfstein, David; Sunderam, Adi (Oxford University Press (OUP), 2019-06-01)
      We develop a model of government portfolio choice in which a benevolent government chooses the scale of risky projects in the presence of market failures and tax distortions. These two frictions generate motives to manage ...