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    • Variable Temptations and Black Mark Reputations 

      Aperjis, Christina; Miao, Yali; Zeckhauser, Richard Jay (John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2012)
      In a world of imperfect information, reputations often guide the sequential decisions to trust and to reward trust. We consider two-player situations, where the players meet but once. One player – the truster – decides ...
    • Variable Temptations and Black Mark Reputations 

      Aperjis, Christina; Miao, Yali; Zeckhauser, Richard Jay (John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2011)
      In a world of imperfect information, reputations often guide the sequential decisions to trust and to reward trust. We consider two-player situations, where one player – the truster – decides whether to trust, and the other ...