The Price of Racial Bias: Intergroup Negotiations in the Ultimatum Game
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Kubota, Jennifer T.
Phelps, Elizabeth A.
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CitationKubota, Jennifer T., Jian Li, Eyal Bar-David, Mahzarin R. Banaji, and Elizabeth A. Phelps. 2013. The price of racial bias: Intergroup negotiations in the Ultimatum Game. Psychological Science 24, no. 12: 2498–2504. doi:10.1177/0956797613496435.
AbstractExisting stereotypes about Black Americans may influence perceptions of intent during financial negotiations. In this study, we explored whether the influence of race on economic decisions extends to choices that are costly to the decision maker. We investigated whether racial group membership contributes to differential likelihood of rejection of objectively equal unfair monetary offers. In the Ultimatum Game, players accept or reject proposed splits of money. Players keep accepted splits, but if a player rejects an offer, both the player and the proposer receive nothing. We found that participants accepted more offers and lower offer amounts from White proposers than from Black proposers, and that this pattern was accentuated for participants with higher implicit race bias. These findings indicate that participants are willing to discriminate against Black proposers even at a cost to their own financial gain.
Citable link to this pagehttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:33471132
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