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dc.contributor.authorAghion, Philippe
dc.contributor.authorAntras, Pol
dc.contributor.authorHelpman, Elhanan
dc.date.accessioned2009-10-15T13:26:43Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.identifier.citationAghion, Philippe, Pol Antras, and Elhanan Helpman. 2007. Negotiating free trade. Journal of International Economics 73(1): 1-30.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0022-1996en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3351239
dc.description.abstractWe develop a dynamic bargaining model in which a leading country endogenously decides whether to sequentially negotiate free trade agreements with subsets of countries or engage in simultaneous multilateral bargaining with all countries at once. We show how the structure of coalition externalities shapes the choice between sequential and multilateral bargaining, and we identify circumstances in which the grand coalition is the equilibrium outcome, leading to worldwide free trade. A model of international trade is then used to illustrate equilibrium outcomes and how they depend on the structure of trade and protection. Global free trade is not achieved when the political-economy motive for protection is sufficiently large. Furthermore, the model generates both “building bloc” and “stumbling bloc” effects of preferential trade agreements. In particular, we describe an equilibrium in which global free trade is attained only when preferential trade agreements are permitted to form (a building bloc effect), and an equilibrium in which global free trade is attained only when preferential trade agreements are forbidden (a stumbling bloc effect). The analysis identifies conditions under which each of these outcomes emerges.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipEconomicsen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2006.12.003en_US
dash.licenseLAA
dc.subjectbargainingen_US
dc.subjecttrade agreementsen_US
dc.subjectregionalismen_US
dc.subjectmultilateralismen_US
dc.subjectcoalition externalitiesen_US
dc.titleNegotiating Free Tradeen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionAccepted Manuscripten_US
dc.relation.journalJournal of International Economicsen_US
dash.depositing.authorAntras, Pol
dc.date.available2009-10-15T13:26:43Z
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jinteco.2006.12.003*
dash.contributor.affiliatedHelpman, Elhanan
dash.contributor.affiliatedAghion, Philippe
dash.contributor.affiliatedAntras, Pol


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