Economic game theory for mutualism and cooperation

DSpace/Manakin Repository

Economic game theory for mutualism and cooperation

Citable link to this page

 

 
Title: Economic game theory for mutualism and cooperation
Author: Archetti, Marco; Scheuring, István; Hoffman, Moshe; Frederickson, Megan E.; Pierce, Naomi E.; Yu, Douglas W.

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: Archetti, Marco, István Scheuring, Moshe Hoffman, Megan E. Frederickson, Naomi E. Pierce, and Douglas W. Yu. 2011. “Economic Game Theory for Mutualism and Cooperation.” Ecology Letters 14 (12) (October 20): 1300–1312. doi:10.1111/j.1461-0248.2011.01697.x.
Access Status: Full text of the requested work is not available in DASH at this time (“dark deposit”). For more information on dark deposits, see our FAQ.
Full Text & Related Files:
Abstract: We review recent work at the interface of economic game theory and evolutionary biology that provides new insights into the evolution of partner choice, host sanctions, partner fidelity feedback and public goods. (1) The theory of games with asymmetrical information shows that the right incentives allow hosts to screen-out parasites and screen-in mutualists, explaining successful partner choice in the absence of signalling. Applications range from ant-plants to microbiomes. (2) Contract theory distinguishes two longstanding but weakly differentiated explanations of host response to defectors: host sanctions and partner fidelity feedback. Host traits that selectively punish misbehaving symbionts are parsimoniously interpreted as pre-adaptations. Yucca-moth and legume-rhizobia mutualisms are argued to be examples of partner fidelity feedback. (3) The theory of public goods shows that cooperation in multi-player interactions can evolve in the absence of assortment, in one-shot social dilemmas among non-kin. Applications include alarm calls in vertebrates and exoenzymes in microbes.
Published Version: doi:10.1111/j.1461-0248.2011.01697.x
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:33703665
Downloads of this work:

Show full Dublin Core record

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

 
 

Search DASH


Advanced Search
 
 

Submitters