I—Richard Moran: Testimony, Illocution and the Second Person

View/ Open
Author
Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8349.2013.00222.xMetadata
Show full item recordCitation
Moran, Richard. 2013. “I—Richard Moran: Testimony, Illocution and the Second Person.” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1) (June 1): 115–135. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8349.2013.00222.x.Abstract
The notion of ‘bipolar’ or ‘second-personal’ normativity is often illustrated by such situations as that of one person addressing a complaint to another, or asserting some right, or claiming some authority. This paper argues that the presence of speech acts of various kinds in the development of the idea of the ‘second-personal’ is not accidental. Through development of a notion of ‘illocutionary authority’ I seek to show a role for the ‘second-personal’ in ordinary testimony, despite Darwall's argument that the notion of the ‘second-personal’ marks a divide between practical and theoretical reason.Terms of Use
This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#OAPCitable link to this page
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:33725207
Collections
- FAS Scholarly Articles [17845]
Contact administrator regarding this item (to report mistakes or request changes)