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dc.contributor.authorMoran, Richard A.
dc.date.accessioned2017-08-08T16:13:27Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.citationMoran, Richard. 2013. “I—Richard Moran: Testimony, Illocution and the Second Person.” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1) (June 1): 115–135. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8349.2013.00222.x.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0309-7013en_US
dc.identifier.issn1467-8349en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:33725207
dc.description.abstractThe notion of ‘bipolar’ or ‘second-personal’ normativity is often illustrated by such situations as that of one person addressing a complaint to another, or asserting some right, or claiming some authority. This paper argues that the presence of speech acts of various kinds in the development of the idea of the ‘second-personal’ is not accidental. Through development of a notion of ‘illocutionary authority’ I seek to show a role for the ‘second-personal’ in ordinary testimony, despite Darwall's argument that the notion of the ‘second-personal’ marks a divide between practical and theoretical reason.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipPhilosophyen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherOxford University Press (OUP)en_US
dc.relation.isversionofdoi:10.1111/j.1467-8349.2013.00222.xen_US
dc.relation.hasversionhttp://www.academia.edu/4342731/Testimony_Illocution_and_the_Second-Personen_US
dash.licenseOAP
dc.titleI—Richard Moran: Testimony, Illocution and the Second Personen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionAccepted Manuscripten_US
dc.relation.journalAristotelian Society Supplementary Volumeen_US
dash.depositing.authorMoran, Richard A.
dc.date.available2017-08-08T16:13:27Z
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1467-8349.2013.00222.x*
workflow.legacycommentsFAR 2014 Moran emailed 2016-05-7 MM Moran emailed 2017-03-2 MM Manuscript recieved 2017-03-02 MMen_US
dash.contributor.affiliatedMoran, Richard


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