Capacity, Commitment, and Compliance

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Capacity, Commitment, and Compliance

Show simple item record Simmons, Beth 2009-11-05T18:05:26Z 2002
dc.identifier.citation Simmons, Beth A. 2002. Capacity, commitment, and compliance. Journal of Conflict Resolution 46(6): 829-856. en_US
dc.identifier.issn 0022-0027 en_US
dc.description.abstract Why should governments delegate decision-making authority over territorial issues to an international institution? This study argues that governments are motivated to reach territorial solutions to reduce the opportunity costs associated with a festering dispute. The evidence suggests that domestic political incapacity to negotiate concessions is associated with a commitment to arbitrate. Compliance is a function of the net costs and benefits involved in accepting the arbitral decision. These costs include the loss of valuable territory, but noncompliance also exacts costs with respect to governments" reputation, both domestically and internationally. This research speaks to a broader debate about the role of international legal institutions in foreign policy making and international outcomes. It shows that governments have good reasons, under certain political and economic conditions, to use international legal processes as a substitute for domestic political decision making. en_US
dc.description.sponsorship Government en_US
dc.language.iso en_US en_US
dc.publisher SAGE Publications en_US
dc.relation.isversionof en_US
dash.license META_ONLY
dc.title Capacity, Commitment, and Compliance en_US
dc.type Journal Article en_US
dc.description.version Version of Record en_US
dc.relation.journal Journal of Conflict Resolution en_US Simmons, Beth
dash.embargo.until 10000-01-01

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