Learning the Prior in Minimal Peer Prediction

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Learning the Prior in Minimal Peer Prediction

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Title: Learning the Prior in Minimal Peer Prediction
Author: Witkowski, Jens; Parkes, David C.

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Citation: Witkowski, Jens, and David C. Parkes. 2013. Learning the Prior in Minimal Peer Prediction. In Proceedings of the 3rd Workshop on Social Computing and User Generated Content (SC 2013), Philadelphia, PA, June 16-20, 2013: 39:1-39:12.
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Abstract: Many crowdsourcing applications rely on the truthful elicitation of information from workers; e.g., voting on the quality of an image label, or whether a website is inappropriate for an advertiser. Peer prediction provides a theoretical mechanism for eliciting truthful reports. However, its application depends on knowledge of a full probabilistic model: both a distribution on votes, and a posterior for each possible single vote received. In earlier work, Witkowski and Parkes [2012b], relax this requirement at the cost of “non-minimality,” i.e., users would need to both vote and report a belief about the vote of others. Other methods insist on minimality but still require knowledge of the distribution on votes, i.e., the signal prior but not the posterior [Jurca and Faltings 2008, 2011; Witkowski and Parkes 2012a]. In this paper, we develop the theoretical foundation for learning the signal prior in combination with these minimal peer-prediction methods. To score an agent, our mechanism uses the empirical frequency of reported signals against which to “shadow” [Witkowski and Parkes 2012a], delaying payments until the empirical frequency is accurate enough. We provide a bound on the number of samples required for the resulting mechanism to provide strict incentives for truthful reporting.
Other Sources: http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/econcs/pubs/Witkowski_ec13.pdf
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:34222829
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