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dc.contributor.authorBertrand, Marianne
dc.contributor.authorMullainathan, Sendhil
dc.date.accessioned2009-12-07T21:55:26Z
dc.date.issued2003
dc.identifier.citationBertrand, Marianne, and Sendhil Mullainathan. 2003. Enjoying the quiet life? Corporate governance and managerial preferences. Journal of Political Economy 111(5): 1043-1075.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0022-3808en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3429713
dc.description.abstractMuch of our understanding of corporations builds on the idea that managers, when they are not closely monitored, will pursue goals that are not in shareholders’ interests. But what goals would managers pursue? This paper uses variation in corporate governance generated by state adoption of antitakeover laws to empirically map out managerial preferences. We use plant‐level data and exploit a unique feature of corporate law that allows us to deal with possible biases associated with the timing of the laws. We find that when managers are insulated from takeovers, worker wages (especially those of white‐collar workers) rise. The destruction of old plants falls, but the creation of new plants also falls. Finally, overall productivity and profitability decline in response to these laws. Our results suggest that active empire building may not be the norm and that managers may instead prefer to enjoy the quiet life.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipEconomicsen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Chicago Pressen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1086/376950en_US
dash.licenseLAA
dc.titleEnjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferencesen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionVersion of Recorden_US
dc.relation.journalJournal of Political Economy -Chicago-en_US
dash.depositing.authorMullainathan, Sendhil
dc.date.available2009-12-07T21:55:26Z
dc.identifier.doi10.1086/376950*
dash.contributor.affiliatedMullainathan, Sendhil


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