The Impact of Regulation on Mortgage Risk: Evidence from India
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https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20130220Metadata
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Campbell, John Y., Tarun Ramadorai, and Benjamin Ranish. 2015. “ The Impact of Regulation on Mortgage Risk: Evidence from India.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 7, no. 4: 71–102. doi:10.1257/pol.20130220.Abstract
We employ loan-level data on over a million loans disbursed in India between 1995 and 2010 to understand how fast-changing regulation impacted mortgage lending and risk. Our paper uses changes in regulatory treatment discontinuities associated with loan size and leverage to detect regulation-induced loan delinquencies. We also find that an acceleration in the classification of assets as nonperforming resulted in substantially lower delinquency probabilities and losses given delinquency.Terms of Use
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http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:34331451
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