Intergenerational Risk Sharing in the Spirit of Arrow, Debreu, and Rawls, with Applications to Social Security Design

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Intergenerational Risk Sharing in the Spirit of Arrow, Debreu, and Rawls, with Applications to Social Security Design

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Title: Intergenerational Risk Sharing in the Spirit of Arrow, Debreu, and Rawls, with Applications to Social Security Design
Author: Ball, Laurence; Mankiw, N. Gregory

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: Ball, Laurence and N. Gregory Mankiw. 2007. Intergenerational risk sharing in the spirit of Arrow, Debreu, and Rawls, with applications to social security design. Journal of Political Economy 115(4): 523-547.
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Abstract: This paper examines the optimal allocation of risk in an overlapping‐generations economy. It compares the allocation of risk the economy reaches naturally to the allocation that would be reached if generations behind a Rawlsian “veil of ignorance” could share risk with one another through complete Arrow‐Debreu contingent‐claims markets. The paper then examines how the government might implement optimal intergenerational risk sharing with a social security system. One conclusion is that the system must either hold equity claims to capital or negatively index benefits to equity returns.
Published Version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/520646
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3443106
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