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dc.contributor.authorHelpman, Elhanan
dc.date.accessioned2009-12-17T14:22:33Z
dc.date.issued1981
dc.identifier.citationHelpman, Elhanan. 1981. An exploration in the theory of exchange-rate regimes. Journal of Political Economy 89(5): 865-890.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0022-3808en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3445091
dc.description.abstractThree exchange-rate regimes--a float, a one-sided peg, and a cooperative peg--are evaluated and compared in terms of efficiency and welfare levels. The framework of analysis embodies country-specific monies, with the money of each country being used to transact in its commodity markets and its currency-denominated bonds. Welfare levels depend only on consumption levels. In the presence of perfect foresight all equilibrium allocations are Pareto efficient. In a floating exchange-rate regime the perfect foresight equilibrium allocation coincides with an equilibrium of a costless barter economy. The same result holds in a one-sided peg if the pegging country's exchange-rate stabilizing authority breaks even over time. In a cooperative peg regime there is a different equilibrium allocation for each combination of exchange-rate levels and monetary policies. Problems of policy coordination and conflicts in desired monetary policies are discussed.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipEconomicsen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Chicago Pressen_US
dc.relation.isversionofdoi:10.1086/261011en_US
dash.licenseLAA
dc.titleAn Exploration in the Theory of Exchange-Rate Regimesen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionVersion of Recorden_US
dc.relation.journalJournal of Political Economy -Chicago-en_US
dash.depositing.authorHelpman, Elhanan
dc.date.available2009-12-17T14:22:33Z
dc.identifier.doi10.1086/261011*
dash.contributor.affiliatedHelpman, Elhanan


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