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dc.contributor.authorGrossman, Sanford J.
dc.contributor.authorHart, Oliver D.
dc.date.accessioned2010-01-05T16:39:16Z
dc.date.issued1986
dc.identifier.citationGrossman, Sanford J., and Oliver D. Hart. 1986. The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral integration. Journal of Political Economy 94(4): 691-719.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0022-3808en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3450060
dc.description.abstractOur theory of costly contracts emphasizes that contractual rights can be of two types: specific rights and residual rights. When it is costly to list all specific rights over assets in the contract, it may be optimal to let one party purchase all residual rights. Ownership is the purchase of these residual rights. When residual rights are purchased by one party, they are lost by a second party, and this inevitably creates distortions. Firm 1 purchases firm 2 when firm 1's control increases the productivity of its management more than the loss of control decreases the productivity of firm 2's management.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipEconomicsen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Chicago Pressen_US
dc.relation.isversionofdoi:10.1086/261404en_US
dash.licenseLAA
dc.titleThe Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integrationen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionVersion of Recorden_US
dc.relation.journalJournal of Political Economy -Chicago-en_US
dash.depositing.authorHart, Oliver D.
dc.date.available2010-01-05T16:39:16Z
dc.identifier.doi10.1086/261404*
dash.contributor.affiliatedHart, Oliver


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