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dc.contributor.authorShleifer, Andrei
dc.date.accessioned2010-01-12T14:55:21Z
dc.date.issued1986
dc.identifier.citationShleifer, Andrei. 1986. Implementation cycles. Journal of Political Economy 94(6): 1163-1190.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0022-3808en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3451303
dc.description.abstractThe paper describes an artificial economy in which firms in different sectors make inventions at different times but innovate simultaneously to take advantage of high aggregate demand. In turn, high demand results from simultaneous innovation in many sectors. The economy exhibits multiple cyclical equilibria, with entrepreneurs' expectations determining which equilibrium obtains. These equilibria are Pareto ranked, and the most profitable equilibrium need not be the most efficient. While an informed stabilization policy can sometimes raise welfare, if large booms are necessary to cover fixed costs of innovation, stabilization policy can stop all technological progress.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipEconomicsen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Chicago Pressen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1086/261428en_US
dc.relation.hasversionhttp://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~lchrist/papers/implementation.pdf
dash.licenseMETA_ONLY
dc.titleImplementation Cyclesen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionVersion of Recorden_US
dc.relation.journalJournal of Political Economy -Chicago-en_US
dash.depositing.authorShleifer, Andrei
dash.embargo.until10000-01-01
dc.date.available2010-01-12T14:55:21Z
dc.identifier.doi10.1086/261428*
dash.contributor.affiliatedShleifer, Andrei


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