The Evolution of Common Law
Access StatusFull text of the requested work is not available in DASH at this time ("restricted access"). For more information on restricted deposits, see our FAQ.
MetadataShow full item record
CitationGennaioli, Nicola, and Andrei Shleifer. 2007. The evolution of common law. Journal of Political Economy 115(1): 43-68.
AbstractWe present a model of lawmaking by appellate courts in which judges influenced by policy preferences can distinguish precedents at some cost. We find a cost and a benefit of diversity of judicial views. Policy‐motivated judges distort the law away from efficiency, but diversity of judicial views also fosters legal evolution and increases the law’s precision. We call our central finding the Cardozo theorem: even when judges are motivated by personal agendas, legal evolution is, on average, beneficial because it washes out judicial biases and renders the law more precise. Our paper provides a theoretical foundation for the evolutionary adaptability of common law.
Citable link to this pagehttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3451305
- FAS Scholarly Articles