Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorGennaioli, Nicola
dc.contributor.authorShleifer, Andrei
dc.date.accessioned2010-01-12T14:58:05Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.identifier.citationGennaioli, Nicola, and Andrei Shleifer. 2007. The evolution of common law. Journal of Political Economy 115(1): 43-68.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0022-3808en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3451305
dc.description.abstractWe present a model of lawmaking by appellate courts in which judges influenced by policy preferences can distinguish precedents at some cost. We find a cost and a benefit of diversity of judicial views. Policy‐motivated judges distort the law away from efficiency, but diversity of judicial views also fosters legal evolution and increases the law’s precision. We call our central finding the Cardozo theorem: even when judges are motivated by personal agendas, legal evolution is, on average, beneficial because it washes out judicial biases and renders the law more precise. Our paper provides a theoretical foundation for the evolutionary adaptability of common law.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipEconomicsen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Chicago Pressen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1086/511996en_US
dc.relation.hasversionhttp://www.economics.harvard.edu/files/faculty/56_Evolution_JPE_final.pdf
dash.licenseMETA_ONLY
dc.titleThe Evolution of Common Lawen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionVersion of Recorden_US
dc.relation.journalJournal of Political Economy -Chicago-en_US
dash.depositing.authorShleifer, Andrei
dash.embargo.until10000-01-01
dc.date.available2010-01-12T14:58:05Z
dc.identifier.doi10.1086/511996*
dash.contributor.affiliatedGennaioli, N
dash.contributor.affiliatedShleifer, Andrei


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record