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dc.contributor.authorHart, Oliver D.
dc.date.accessioned2018-01-24T17:49:20Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.identifier.citationHart, Oliver. 2009. Hold-Up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points. Quarterly Journal of Economics 124, no. 1: 267–300. doi:10.1162/qjec.2009.124.1.267.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0033-5533en_US
dc.identifier.issn1531-4650en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:34728601
dc.description.abstractWe study two parties who desire a smooth trading relationship under conditions of value and cost uncertainty. A contract fixing price works well in normal times because there is nothing to argue about. However, when value or cost is unusually high or low, one party will deviate from the contract and hold up the other party, causing deadweight losses as parties withhold cooperation. We show that allocating asset ownership and indexing contracts can reduce the incentives to engage in hold-up. In contrast to much of the literature, the driving force in our model is payoff uncertainty, rather than noncontractible investments.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipEconomicsen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherOxford University Press (OUP)en_US
dc.relation.isversionofdoi:10.1162/qjec.2009.124.1.267en_US
dc.relation.hasversionhttp://scholar.harvard.edu/files/hart/files/hold-up2cassetownershipandreferencepointsqje.pdfen_US
dash.licenseMETA_ONLY
dc.titleHold-Up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Pointsen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionVersion of Recorden_US
dc.relation.journalQuarterly Journal of Economicsen_US
dash.depositing.authorHart, Oliver D.
dash.embargo.until10000-01-01
dc.identifier.doi10.1162/qjec.2009.124.1.267*
workflow.legacycommentsoap.needman (MM) Hart emailed 2016-05-25 MMen_US
dash.contributor.affiliatedHart, Oliver


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