Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorAlesina, Alberto Francesco
dc.contributor.authorCampante, Filipe Robin
dc.contributor.authorTabellini, Guido
dc.date.accessioned2018-01-24T18:46:32Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.identifier.citationAlesina, Alberto, Filipe R. Campante, and Guido Tabellini. 2008. “Why Is Fiscal Policy Often Procyclical?” Journal of the European Economic Association 6 (5) (September): 1006–1036. doi:10.1162/jeea.2008.6.5.1006.en_US
dc.identifier.issn1542-4766en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:34729976
dc.description.abstractFiscal policy is procyclical in many developing countries. We explain this policy failure with a political agency problem. Procyclicality is driven by voters who seek to “starve the Leviathan” to reduce political rents. Voters observe the state of the economy but not the rents appropriated by corrupt governments. When they observe a boom, voters optimally demand more public goods or lower taxes, and this induces a procyclical bias in fiscal policy. The empirical evidence is consistent with this explanation: Procyclicality of fiscal policy is more pronounced in more corrupt democracies.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipEconomicsen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherWiley-Blackwellen_US
dc.relation.hasversionhttp://www.nber.org/papers/w11600.pdfen_US
dash.licenseMETA_ONLY
dc.titleWhy Is Fiscal Policy Often Procyclical?en_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.date.updated2015-09-17T03:30:02Z
dc.description.versionVersion of Recorden_US
dc.relation.journalJournal of the European Economic Associationen_US
dash.depositing.authorAlesina, Alberto Francesco
dash.embargo.until10000-01-01
workflow.legacycommentsoap.needman (MM) Alesina emailed 2016-05-10 ADen_US
dash.contributor.affiliatedCampante, Filipe
dash.contributor.affiliatedAlesina, Alberto


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record