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dc.contributor.authorShleifer, Andrei
dc.contributor.authorVishny, Robert W.
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-01T15:18:57Z
dc.date.issued1986
dc.identifier.citationShleifer, Andrei and Robert W. Vishny. 1986. Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal of Political Economy 94(3): 461-488.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0022-3808en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3606237
dc.description.abstractIn a corporation with many small owners, it may not pay any one of them to monitor the performance of the management. We explore a model in which the presence of a large minority shareholder provides a partial solution to this free-rider problem. The model sheds light on the following questions: Under what circumstances will we observe a tender offer as opposed to a proxy fight or an internal management shake-up? How strong are the forces pushing toward increasing concentration of ownership of a diffusely held firm? Why do corporate and personal investors commonly hold stock in the same firm, despite their disparate tax preferences?en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipEconomicsen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Chicago Pressen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1086/261385en_US
dc.relation.hasversionhttp://ws1.ad.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/files/lg_shareholders.pdfen_US
dash.licenseMETA_ONLY
dc.titleLarge Shareholders and Corporate Controlen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionVersion of Recorden_US
dc.relation.journalJournal of Political Economy -Chicago-en_US
dash.depositing.authorShleifer, Andrei
dash.embargo.until10000-01-01
dc.identifier.doi10.1086/261385*
dash.contributor.affiliatedShleifer, Andrei


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