Information and Competition in U.S. Forest Service Timber Auctions

DSpace/Manakin Repository

Information and Competition in U.S. Forest Service Timber Auctions

Citable link to this page

 

 
Title: Information and Competition in U.S. Forest Service Timber Auctions
Author: Athey, Susan; Levin, Jonathan

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: Athey, Susan, and Jonathan Levin. 2001. Information and competition in U.S. forest service timber auctions. Journal of Political Economy 109(2): 375-417.
Full Text & Related Files:
Abstract: This paper analyzes the role of private information in U.S. Forest Service timber auctions. In these auctions, firms bid a per unit price for each timber species. Total bids are computed by multiplying these prices by Forest Service volume estimates, but payments depend on actual volumes harvested. We develop an equilibrium theory for these auctions. We then relate (ex post) data about volume to (ex ante) bids. We show that bidders have private information about volumes of species and use it as predicted by theory. Differences in bidder estimates appear to affect the allocation of tracts, but competition limits information rents.
Published Version: doi:10.1086/319558
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3612768
Downloads of this work:

Show full Dublin Core record

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

 
 

Search DASH


Advanced Search
 
 

Submitters