Computational Mechanism Design

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Computational Mechanism Design

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Title: Computational Mechanism Design
Author: Parkes, David C.
Citation: Parkes, David C. 2008. Computational Mechanism Design. Lecture notes of tutorials presented at the 10th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge TARK-05, Singapore.
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Abstract: Computational mechanism design brings together the concern in microeconomics with decision making in the context of distributed private information and self-interest and the concern in computer science with computational and communication complexity. In constructing mechanisms, with application to the design of electronic markets and to protocols for automated negotiation, many new issues arise in resolving tensions between incentive, computation and communication constraints.
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#OAP
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3638634
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