dc.contributor.author | Kremer, Michael R. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-02-24T15:25:39Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1998 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Kremer, Michael R. 1998. Patent buyouts: A mechanism for encouraging innovation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 113(4): 1137-1167. | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 0033-5533 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3693705 | |
dc.description.abstract | In 1839 the French government purchased the Daguerreotype patent and placed it in the public domain. Such patent buyouts could potentially eliminate the monopoly price distortions and incentives for rent-stealing duplicative research created by patents, while increasing incentives for original research. Governments could offer to purchase patents at their estimated private value, as determined in an auction, times a markup equal to the typical ratio of inventions' social and private value. Most patents purchased would be placed in the public domain, but to induce bidders to reveal their valuations, a few would be sold to the highest bidder. | en_US |
dc.description.sponsorship | Economics | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
dc.publisher | MIT Press | en_US |
dc.relation.isversionof | http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/003355398555865 | en_US |
dash.license | LAA | |
dc.title | Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation | en_US |
dc.type | Journal Article | en_US |
dc.description.version | Proof | en_US |
dc.relation.journal | Quarterly Journal of Economics -Cambridge Massachusetts- | en_US |
dash.depositing.author | Kremer, Michael R. | |
dc.date.available | 2010-02-24T15:25:39Z | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1162/003355398555865 | * |
dash.contributor.affiliated | Kremer, Michael | |