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dc.contributor.authorBates, Robert
dc.contributor.authorGreif, Avner
dc.contributor.authorSingh, Smita
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-25T15:37:43Z
dc.date.issued2002
dc.identifier.citationBates, Robert, Avner Greif, and Smita Singh. 2002. Organizing violence. Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 5: 599-628.en
dc.identifier.issn0022-0027en
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3707095
dc.description.abstractIn stateless societies, coercion is privately provided; violence is employed to engage in, and to defend against, predation. At best, violence results in mere redistribution; being destructive, it more often results in a loss of social welfare. When organized, however, violence can be socially productive; it can be employed to defend property rights, thereby strengthening the incentives to engage in productive activity. To explore how violence can be rendered a source of welfare, the authors develop a model of a stateless society in which people's rights to the product of their labor are secure only if they possess coercive capabilities. Using case materials and formal logic, the authors then compare this outcome with that obtained when private agents reward specialists in violence for defending property rights. In doing so, we plumb the role of the state.en
dc.description.sponsorshipAfrican and African American Studiesen
dc.description.sponsorshipGovernmenten
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.publisherSAGE Publicationsen
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002200202236166en
dc.relation.hasversionhttp://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidwp/pdf/071.pdfen
dash.licenseLAA
dc.subjectpolitical economyen
dc.subjectcoercionen
dc.subjectgame theoryen
dc.subjectpolitical orderen
dc.subjectviolenceen
dc.titleOrganizing Violenceen
dc.relation.journalJournal of Conflict Resolutionen
dash.depositing.authorBates, Robert
dc.date.available2010-02-25T15:37:43Z
dc.identifier.doi10.1177/002200202236166*
dash.contributor.affiliatedSingh, Smita
dash.contributor.affiliatedBates, Robert


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