Job Search and Hiring with Two-Sided Limited Information about Workseekers' Skills
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Carranza, Eliana, Robert Garlick, Kate Orkin, and Neil Rankin. “Job Search and Hiring with Two-Sided Limited Information about Workseekers' Skills.” CID Working Paper Series 2020.383, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, July 2020.Abstract
This paper presents field experimental evidence that limited information about workseekers’ skills distorts both firm and workseeker behavior. Assessing workseekers’ skills, giving workseekers their assessment results, and helping them to credibly share the results with firms increases workseekers’ employment and earnings. It also aligns their beliefs and search strategies more closely with their skills. Giving assessment results only to workseekers has similar effects on beliefs and search, but smaller effects on employment and earnings. Giving assessment results only to firms increases callbacks. These patterns are consistent with two-sided information frictions, a new finding that can inform the design of information-provision mechanisms.Terms of Use
This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAACitable link to this page
https://nrs.harvard.edu/URN-3:HUL.INSTREPOS:37366419
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