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dc.contributor.advisorAlvarez, George A.
dc.contributor.authorDe Freitas, Julian
dc.date.accessioned2021-07-13T05:58:49Z
dash.embargo.terms2023-07-12
dc.date.created2021
dc.date.issued2021-07-12
dc.date.submitted2021-05
dc.identifier.citationDe Freitas, Julian. 2021. How Many Selves Can You Represent At Once?. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences.
dc.identifier.other28498867
dc.identifier.urihttps://nrs.harvard.edu/URN-3:HUL.INSTREPOS:37368384*
dc.description.abstractCuriously, we humans experience a sense of self. What is more, this sense of self accompanies not only our physical bodies, but is also a part of our imaginations. We can take on different identities, imagine past, future, and hypothetical versions of ourselves, engage in social perspective taking, and more. Given how flexible self-representation is, I will ask a question about its fundamental nature: can we represent multiple selves at once? To answer this question, I will consider thirteen domains of self-representation: self-localization, mental imagery, social perspective taking, representing close and far others, self-reference effects, ownership, personal identity, internal conflicts, split-brain patients, the illusion of conscious will, schizophrenia, dissociative identity disorder, and heautoscopy. Chapters 1 and 2 focus in detail on self-representation, Chapter 3 focuses on personal identity, and the discussion looks across all thirteen phenomena. Contrary to the idea of multiple parallel self-representation, I will argue that empirical findings illuminate an architecture that represents at most one self-relevant item at once (e.g., a particular body, or conceptual identity like ‘young you’), with different self-relevant items competing and serially switching out for self-representation (‘Single Serial Self’ theory). The limits of this architecture can be distinguished from known limits on attention, consciousness, and memory, and might have evolved to be this way for specific functional or social reasons.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen
dash.licenseLAA
dc.subjectcapacity limits
dc.subjectmental imagery
dc.subjectpersonal identity
dc.subjectself
dc.subjectself-representation
dc.subjectsocial perspective-taking
dc.subjectPsychology
dc.titleHow Many Selves Can You Represent At Once?
dc.typeThesis or Dissertation
dash.depositing.authorDe Freitas, Julian
dash.embargo.until2023-07-12
dc.date.available2021-07-13T05:58:49Z
thesis.degree.date2021
thesis.degree.grantorHarvard University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
thesis.degree.levelDoctoral
thesis.degree.namePh.D.
dc.contributor.committeeMemberPinker, Steven
dc.contributor.committeeMemberUllman, Tomer
dc.contributor.committeeMemberRips, Lance
dc.type.materialtext
thesis.degree.departmentPsychology
dc.identifier.orcid0000-0003-4912-1391
dash.author.emailjulzdefreitas@gmail.com


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