Can Staggered Boards Improve Value? Causal Evidence from Massachusetts
Li, Shelley Xin
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CitationDaines, Robert, Shelley Xin Li, and Charles C.Y. Wang. "Can Staggered Boards Improve Value? Causal Evidence from Massachusetts." Contemporary Accounting Research 38, no. 4 (Winter 2021): 3053–3084.
AbstractWe study the effect of staggered boards (SBs) using a quasi-experiment: a 1990 law that imposed an SB on all Massachusetts-incorporated firms. The law led to an increase in Tobin's Q, investment in CAPEX and R&D, patents, higher-quality patented innovations, and resulted in higher profitability. These effects are concentrated at innovating firms, especially those facing greater Wall Street scrutiny. An increase in institutional and dedicated investors also accompanied the imposition of SBs, facilitating a longer-term orientation. The evidence suggests that early-life-cycle firms facing high information asymmetries benefit from SBs by allowing managers to focus on long-term investments and innovations.
Citable link to this pagehttps://nrs.harvard.edu/URN-3:HUL.INSTREPOS:37373285
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