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dc.contributor.authorLai, Lei
dc.contributor.authorBowles, Hannah Riley
dc.contributor.authorBabcock, Linda
dc.date.accessioned2018-12-18T11:54:50Z
dc.date.issued2013-01-29
dc.identifier.citationLai, Lei. No date. Social Costs of Setting High Aspirations in Competitive Negotiation. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University.
dc.identifier.issn1750-4708en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:37927289*
dc.description.abstractThis paper explores the implications of a negotiator setting high aspirations on the counterpart’s assessments of the negotiator and future cooperation toward the negotiator. Participants were 134 undergraduates acting as buyers or sellers in a single-issue price negotiation. Buyers received instructions to set more or less ambitious aspirations. Buyers who set more ambitious aspirations achieved better economic outcomes. However, sellers paired with buyers setting more ambitious aspirations found their buyers to be less likeable, expressed less willingness to cooperate with them in the future, and behaved less generously toward them in a post-negotiation dictator game. The perceived likeability of the buyer explained why the sellers were less willing to cooperate in the future with buyers who had set more ambitious aspirations. This research contributes to the understanding of the downside of setting high aspirations in a competitive negotiation and provides implications on balancing one-time economic gain with future social loss.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherWileyen_US
dc.relation.isversionofdoi:10.1111/ncmr.12000en_US
dash.licenseLAA
dc.subjectResearch Subject Categories::SOCIAL SCIENCESen_US
dc.titleSocial Costs of Setting High Aspirations in Competitive Negotiationen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.relation.journalNegotiation and Conflict Management Researchen_US
dc.date.available2018-12-18T11:54:50Z
dash.affiliation.otherHarvard Kennedy Schoolen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/ncmr.12000
dc.source.journalNegotiation Confl Manage Res
dash.source.volume6;1
dash.source.page1-12
dash.contributor.affiliatedBowles, Hannah


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