Why Markets Could (But Don't Currently) Solve Resource Allocation Problems in Systems

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Why Markets Could (But Don't Currently) Solve Resource Allocation Problems in Systems

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Title: Why Markets Could (But Don't Currently) Solve Resource Allocation Problems in Systems
Author: Shneidman, Jeffery; Ng, Chaki; Parkes, David C.; Young, Alvin Au; Snoeren, Alex C.; Vahdat, Amin; Chun, Brent

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Citation: Shneidman, Jeffery, Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes, Alvin AuYoung, Alex C. Snoeren, Amin Vahdat, and Brent Chun. 2005. Why markets could (but don't currently) solve resource allocation problems in systems. Paper presented at the 10th Workshop on Hot Topics in Operating Systems in Santa Fe, NM, June 12–15, 2005.
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Abstract: Using market mechanisms for resource allocation in distributed systems is not a new idea, nor is it one that has caught on in practice or with a large body of computer science research. Yet, projects that use markets for distributed resource allocation recur every few years [1, 2, 3], and a new generation of research is exploring market-based resource allocation mechanisms [4, 5, 6, 7, 8] for distributed environments such as Planetlab, Netbed, and computational grids.

This paper has three goals. The first goal is to explore why markets can be appropriate to use for allocation, when simpler allocation mechanisms exist. The second goal is to demonstrate why a new look at markets for allocation could be timely, and not a re-hash of previous research. The third goal is to point out some of the thorny problems inherent in market deployment and to suggest action items both for market designers and for the greater research community. We are optimistic about the power of market design, but we also believe that key challenges exist for a markets/systems integration that must be overcome for market-based computer resource allocation systems to succeed.
Published Version: http://www.usenix.org/events/hotos05/final_papers/full_papers/shneidman/shneidman_html/
Other Sources: http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/~jeffsh/pubs/hotos05/05hotos.pdf
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4000303
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