Fairness with an Honest Minority and a Rational Majority

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Fairness with an Honest Minority and a Rational Majority

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Title: Fairness with an Honest Minority and a Rational Majority
Author: Ong, Shien Jin; Parkes, David C.; Rosen, Alon; Vadhan, Salil P.

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Citation: Ong, Shien Jin, David C. Parkes, Alon Rosen, and Salil Vadhan. 2009. Fairness with an honest minority and a rational majority. In Theory of Cryptography, ed. O. Reingold, 36-53. Berlin: Springer. Previously published in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 5444: 36-53.
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Abstract: We provide a simple protocol for secret reconstruction in any threshold secret sharing scheme, and prove that it is fair when executed with many rational parties together with a small minority of honest parties. That is, all parties will learn the secret with high probability when the honest parties follow the protocol and the rational parties act in their own self-interest (as captured by a set-Nash analogue of trembling hand perfect equilibrium). The protocol only requires a standard (synchronous) broadcast channel, tolerates both early stopping and incorrectly computed messages, and only requires 2 rounds of communication.
Previous protocols for this problem in the cryptographic or economic models have either required an honest majority, used strong communication channels that enable simultaneous exchange of information, or settled for approximate notions of security/equilibria. They all also required a nonconstant number of rounds of communication.
Published Version: doi:10.1007/978-3-642-00457-5_3
Other Sources: http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/~alon/PAPERS/OPRV/OPRV09.pdf
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4000763
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